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I argue that three dierent notions of essence—temporal, denitional, andmodal—
are all distinct notions, and are all philosophically useful. Aer dening the dier-
ent notions, I discuss the philosophical problems each addresses.
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1. e Problems of Essence
ere are (at least) two schools of thought concerning essence. One school
says that an essential property of a thing is a property that the thing can-
not exist without. According to this school, Socrates is essentially human
because it is impossible for Socrates to exist and not be human. To use
possible-worlds talk, Socrates is essentially human because on every pos-
sible world on which Socrates exists, he is human.1 Another school says that
the essence of a thing is a fundamental property that makes the thing what
it is. According to this school, Socrates is essentially human because that is
part of what it is to be Socrates.2e philosophers of the second school oen
frame their discussions by arguing that those of the rst school are not talk-
ing about essence at all. For example, Oderberg denies that “real essence” has
“anything to do with possible worlds” (Oderberg 2007, 12). Philosophers of
the rst school typically ignore the arguments of those of the second school,
but in informal discussion may also deny that those in the second camp are
talking about essence.
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1 e standard bearers of this school are Putnam and Kripke, and recent examples include
Divers (2002) and Mackie (2006).
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Sometimes philosophical debates are substantial, in that both sides agree
that there is a certain feature of reality, but disagree over its nature. But some-
times philosophical debates are insubstantial, in that each side is discussing a
dierent philosophically interesting issue and has either found or postulated
a feature of reality that explains this issue.3 If the essentialist debate is sub-
stantial, there is a philosophically interesting feature of reality—essence—
and there is disagreement over its nature. If this debate is insubstantial, each
side may believe in the entity postulated by the other; there may be no real
disagreement over the way things are. Consider, for example, the debate
over possible worlds. Some (modal realists) hold that possible worlds are
concrete objects, the same in kind as this world; others (some modal er-
satzists) hold that possible worlds are maximal consistent states of aairs.
What is the nature of this disagreement? If this debate is substantial, there
are these philosophically interesting entities—possible worlds—and there is
disagreement over their nature. David Lewis rejects this view of the debate:
It is wrong to say that the ersatz modal realists and I agree at least that
possible worlds exist, and disagree only about whether those worlds
are abstract or concrete. . .e ersatzers just do not believe in what I
call worlds; and sometimes—depending on which view of ersatzism
we consider—I just do not believe in what they call worlds. (Lewis
1986, 140)
If Lewis is right, this debate is not substantial. It may be that each side is
involved in explaining a dierent problem, and so postulating dierent en-
tities: the modal realist is trying to give a reductive account of modality, and
the ersatzist is trying to provide a model to illuminate our modal intuitions.
However the debate over possible worlds is best seen, I believe the debate
between essentialists is insubstantial. Each side has found a cluster of philo-
sophical issues that can be addressed by something that side calls “essence”.
e cluster of issues partly overlaps, so it is perhaps natural that both schools
use the same term, but the philosophers in the two schools are addressing
dierent philosophical problems, and the notion of essence that they each
invoke is dierent.4
3 Some philosophical debatesmay be neither of these. For example, each sidemay agree that
the feature identied by the other exists, but disagree over which best lls the theoretical
role both sides agree on.emodal realist and the ersatzermay both believe in both classes
of entities (the concrete worlds and the states of aairs), and there is disagreement over
which theory best explains the modal phenomena, and so which class of entities should be
called ‘possible worlds’. (An ersatzer may believe that the best scientic theory postulates
a multiplicity of entities like our world without believing that they are adequate to explain
why someone else’s properties explain my modal properties.)
4 In saying this I am not discussing whether either or both kinds of essence are real. It may
be that both sides have found a feature of reality, and it may be that either or both are
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I have spoken of two schools, but in fact, there are more than two. I will
discuss three dierent notions of essence, and argue that they are irreducibly
dierent.
1.1 Essence as constancy amid change
e rst notion of essence has its home in discussion of the problem of
change. As oen happens in philosophy, more than one problem deserves
this label. One such problem could be said like this:ere are strong argu-
ments (due primarily to Parmenides and his followers) that change is impos-
sible. And yet it is as obvious as anything is that there is change. How are we
to resolve this aporia? Aristotle’s answer to this problem is that no change is
a what-is coming to be from what-is-not simpliciter; in every change there
is a substratum that remains throughout the change. So if Socrates becomes
sunburnt, that change is not simply being-sunburnt coming to be from not-
being-sunburnt; it is a change in Socrates. It is one of themarks of Aristotle’s
genius that many of his solutions seem obvious; this is among those. Clearly
Socrates’ becoming sunburnt has something to do with Socrates, and not
only with the bare being-sunburnt and not-being-sunburnt.
But oncewehave said that, we still have a further problem. Some changes
result in something new coming into being or passing away, and some do
not. A sprout grows into a sapling, which grows into a tree, which is cut
down and burnt, becoming re and ash.e change from a sprout to a tree
is a profound change, but that change does not create a new thing nor de-
stroy an old thing. e change from a tree to re and ash is also profound,
and this does result in the destruction of the tree. e problem in general
is this: What is the dierence between a supercial change in an underlying
substratum and a passing away? is problem has an instance that is exis-
tentially immediate: personal identity across time. Some changes a person
undergoes are only accidental: skin color may change in the sun, hair color
may change with age, tastes may change with education, but it is a single
person undergoing these changes. But what of an injury that alters person-
ality or erases memory? What of some physically minor, or even invisible,
change that results in death?
One notion of essence is bound up with this problem, sometimes as its
solution, sometimes merely as a label. We could either assume that the dis-
tinction between destruction and alteration is well understood, and use that
distinction to dene essence, or we could assume we understand essence,
and use that denition to distinguish between destruction and alteration.5
theoretical posits. I wish to set that issue aside.
5 Aristotle’s own direction of explanation seemed to dier in dierent books. In his inquiry
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Among recent writers on essence we can nd both approaches. As an exam-
ple of the former approach, Brody (1973) says “is distinction is one that
we are all familiar with. . .Given this distinction, we are now in a position
to introduce a very simple theory of essentialism.” Others (e.g., Copi 1954)
consider this approach circular, claiming that if we distinguish the kinds of
change by reference to the distinction between essence and accident, we can-
not then dene essence and accident by reference to the kinds of change.
Without deciding which distinction is prior, we can identify the notion
of essence relevant to the problem of change. If one considers the destruc-
tion/alteration distinction to be prior, one can take the following to be a
denition of essence. If one takes the notion of essence as prior, one can
take the following as criteria. An accident is a property that changes without
causing the destruction of the thing changed; an essence is a property that
cannot changewithout causing the destruction of the thing changed. Mackie
(2006) calls this the “Weak Aristotelian sense” of essence:
A is an essence of B i A is a property of B and, necessarily, if A is a
property of B at any time B exists, A is a property of B at all times B
exists.
A is an accident of B i A is a property of B that is not an essence.6
is temporal notion of essence is adequte for the problem of change. If we
can make sense of the deniens (particularly what it means for something
to exist at a time), then we understand this notion of essence. Otherwise
we take essence as given here to label the problem: “essence” is the thing
that survives every change short of destruction, so if we could only dene
‘essence’ non-circularly, we would be able to distinguish alteration and de-
struction. Why should we call this a notion of essence? Two reasons: First,
there is an august philosophical tradition of speaking of this notion as what
Aristotle meant when he introduced the notion of essence (e.g., Copi 1954,
Marcus 1971, Mackie 2006). Second, an essence is supposed to be a property
into the nature of substance (ousia) in the Categories, he takes as the most distinctive
mark of substance that it survives change (Cat. 4a10). In his renewed inquiry into sub-
stance in Metaphysics Z, he may repeat this assertion, depending on how one interprets
his claim of temporal priority (Met. 1028a31–33). But when he turns to explaining the
dierence between destruction and alteration, he seems to take the distinction between
substratum (hupokeimena) and accident (pathos) as well understood (De Gen. I.4): “e
hupokeimenon is one thing, and the pathos. . . something else, and. . . genesis is change of
the one, and alteration is change of the other” (Broadie 2004).
6 Oen this notion will be expressed with the phrase ‘cannot lose’ (or ‘cannot lose without
ceasing to exist’). Such properties as being an adult, or being a parent, or being more than
5 years old, or being a non-virgin, or having visited Vienna—all these are properties that,
having once gained them, one cannot lose without ceasing to exist, and yet they do not
seemparticularly relevant to the problem of change, and do not seem intuitively “essential”.
76 Essence, Essence and Essence
that is fundamental with respect to some philosophically interesting prob-
lem. Because temporal essence is the fundamental property with respect to
the problem of change, it can legitimately be called a kind of essence.
1.2 Essence as explanation
In Posterior Analytics B 90a31–34 and elsewhere, Aristotle argues that the
answer to what a thing is is the answer to why it is, i.e., that essences ex-
plain.is is taken to be a central function of essence by Copi (1954), Mar-
cus (1971), Kung (1977), Gorman (2005), and others. It may be what Locke
was aer in saying, “e real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown
Constitution ofings, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may
be called their Essence.” And yet the notion of essence given above will not
serve to explain.
A notion that does serve to explain could be called the denitional no-
tion of essence:
A is an essence of B i A is the most basic fact about B, the (possi-
bly molecular) fact about B which, perhaps together with facts not
about B, grounds all other explainable facts about B.
A is an accident of B i A is a fact about B but not an essence.7
is notion of essence has its inspiration in Aristotle’s vision of a complete
science. e basic idea is that there is a core proposition about that thing
from which all the rest follow.is core proposition might be called its def-
inition. Hence, for example, given the denition of a triangle as a closed
plane gure bounded by three straight lines, and assuming a background
theory of geometry, all other truths about triangles can be deduced, such as
that it has three interior angles, and that these three angles are equivalent to
two right angles. In general, for each entity there is a core set of true propo-
sitions about it. is set of propositions, together with a background set of
propositions not about it, entail every true proposition about the entity.8
7 On this view an essence is not a property but a proposition. is is, I believe, histori-
cally accurate: Aristotle believed that an essence was a denition—a ‘logos’—rather than
a property. Locke says that the real essence is not a property but “that real constitution
of anying, which is the foundation of all those Properties” (III.vi.6). But the primary
reason to take essence to be this way is that it is propositions, not properties, that entail
each other. But the dierence is slight. If we prefer to speak of properties being essential,
we can say that the essence of x is the property E such that the proposition that x has E
entails all true propositions about x.
8 is approach goes back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics—see e.g., (Koslicki 2012)—but
ignores any of the nuances of Aristotle’s positition. As presented here the approach also
owes much to Horwich (1998).
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Aristotle’s vision is liable to an immediate objection. Apart from math-
ematical or logical entities, there do not seem to be any examples of prop-
erties arranged in this nice axiomatic way. e idea can be salvaged by re-
placing the concept of entailment, or logical dependence, with the concept
of grounding, or ontological dependence. One central idea is that modality,
whether of a logical or of ametaphysical kind, makes for thewrong relations.
Consider two facts: the fact that gold has atomic number 79, and the fact that
goldmelts at 1064○C. What is the relation between these two facts?is can-
not be logical necessity, since the proposition that gold has atomic number
79 does not logically imply anything about gold’s melting point. And even if
these two facts hold on the same set of worlds, it seems that this gives mere
supervenience that does not account for an important feature of the relation
between the two facts: gold melts at the temperature it does because of its
atomic number; it does not have its atomic number because of its melting
point.9 is is the idea behind grounding. If we replace the logical notion
of implication with the ontological notion of grounding, we can give new
denitions of essence. Roughly, A is an essence of B i A is the fact about B
that grounds all the other facts about B.
e intelligibility of such an account of essence turns on the intelligibility
of the notion of grounding. I do not have the room to defend the notion here.
I will leave it at the intuitive level: goldmelts at 1064○Cbecause of somemore
basic fact about gold.10 Whatever relation that ‘because of ’ picks out is the
grounding relation.
But this is still subject to an obvious objection: It seems that the actual
facts about anything depend onmore than just the essence of that thing. For
example, gold melts at a higher temperature than water. If this fact follows
simply from the essence of gold, then the essence of any thing will tell us the
essence of all. But then there would not be essences of things, but rather a
universally basic fact, a rst principle of the world. And further, if we disre-
gard these and consider only the “intrinsic” properties of a thing, only those
properties that are about that thing only and nothing else, we cannot even
explain all of those. Even the instrinsic properties of a thing do not seem to
be wholly determined by the thing’s essence. For example, the atomic num-
ber of gold determines the melting point of gold, but only given some extra
assumptions. If the laws of nature were dierent, gold might have the same
atomic number and yet have a dierent melting point. So even the instrinsic
properties of a thing are determined only in part by the thing’s essence. Be-
9 I assume here that the atomic number is the more basic fact. If this should turn out to be
wrong, nothing in my argument is aected.
10 But see, for example, (Fine 2001), (Rosen 2010), (Schaer 2009), and the various essays in
(Correia and Schnieder 2012).
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cause of these considerations, we must say that essence of a thing is at most
a partial explanation. Just as the denition of a triangle does not by itself en-
tail the facts about triangles, but only with a background set of assumptions
(i.e., the axioms of geometry), so the essence of a thing does not by itself
ground all the facts about it, but only with a set of background assumptions.
e dierence between the essence and the background assumptions is that
the essence is a fact about the thing, while the background assumptions are
facts not about the thing.11
And there is still an obvious objection: Everything has “very accidental”
properties that seem unable to be explained by the essence. For example,
Socrates is sitting. How is this fact supposed to be explained by Socrates’
essence? e obvious response to such an objection is that this notion of
essence is restricted to kinds, not individuals. On this notion of essence,
Socrates has no individual essence, so such facts are not explicable. What is
explicable are the facts about kinds: gold’s melting point, conductivity, etc.
But this response is insucient, since even natural kinds have these “very
accidental” properties that seem inexplicable by any essential property. It is
a fact about gold that the ring onmy hand is gold; it is a fact about the species
human that this particular human is sitting. So it will not do to require the
essence to explain everything. Weneed tomake some restriction on the class
of facts that essence must account for.
In her discussion of explanation, Marcus quotes Shylock: “If you pricke
vs doe we not bleede? if you tickle vs, doe we not laugh? if you poison vs doe
we not die?”is is a list of dispositional facts about humans: they bleed if
pricked, laugh if ticked, die if poisoned.e fact about gold’s melting point
(that it melts if heated to 1064○C) is also dispositional, as are facts about
its conductivity, malleability, etc. e essence of a kind must account for
all the dispositional facts about the members of that kind. Earlier in his
speech, Shylock says, “Hath not a Iew eyes? hath not a Iew hands, organs,
dementions, sences, aections, passions.” e fact that a human being has
eyes is not a dispositional fact, but what we could call a structural fact, and it
toomust be explained. Similarly, the fact that the interior angles of a triangle
sum to two right angles is a structural fact.
Here are two classes of facts—dispositional and structural—that should
be explained by essence. e list could be lengthened, but we can leave it
open-ended, and call such facts “explainable facts”. e essence of a kind
should explain every explainable fact about that kind.12
11 A rough test for aboutness: A proposition p is about an entity x if the canonical name of
p refers to x. So the proposition that gold is malleable is about gold.
12 ere may be more qualications needed to answer all objections. It may be, then, that
this notion of essence is primitive, and the denition above is really a list of connections
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Aswe did with the temporal notion of essence, wemight ask whatmakes
this a notion of essence? And we can give the same answers as before. Many
(e.g., Copi 1954, Marcus 1971, Kung 1977) have taken explanation to be the
central job of essence, and this notion of essence is central in a philosophi-
cally interesting problem—the problem of organizing discrete facts into ex-
planation.
1.3 Essence as Necessity
Neither of the notions of essence I have discussed so far is the one that has
become familiar from Quine, Kripke, Plantinga, and their followers.13 On
this notion, essence is dened in terms of necessity:
A is an essence of B i B is necessarily A. (i B is A on every world
on which B exists.)
A is an accident of B i B is contingently B. (i B is A on the actual
world, but B is not A on some other world.)
(I will call this the modal notion of essence. I do so with some trepidation,
since there are also temporal modes. But the term is simpler than its alter-
natives, and no more confusing.)14
emodal notion of essence, alongwith possible-worlds talk, has turned
out to be enormously powerful. It has been used in the philosophy of lan-
guage (e.g., in the rejection of Frege-Russell semantics, in distinguishing ex-
tension from intension, in dening propositions), in the philosophy of sci-
to other concepts.
13 Despite the fact thatMoore denes ‘internal relation’ in roughly the sameway, the contem-
porary use of the word ‘essence’ to pick out a modal notion can, I think, be fairly attributed
to Quine. Carnap (1956), Copi (1954) and others during the 1940s and ’50s understood
essence in roughly the denitional sense. e defenders of “Aristotelian essentialism,”
from Marcus and Kripke on down, have taken their positions in opposition to Quine.
And hence, despite protests by Aristotelians and others, essence came to be understood
in roughly the way Quine understood it. It is sometimes claimed that Aristotle held the
modal notion, but this is dubious. e claim usually rests on the denition of ‘accident’
(sumbebe¯kos) as “that which may belong and not belong to one and the same thing” (Top-
ics 102b6–7). But even if the modal word ‘may’ means something like what it means for
Kripke et al. (and not that it hold for only somemembers of a class, as in Topics B.1, or that
it holds only at some times, as inCat. 4a18–21), Aristotle here has dened not ‘accident’, but
‘merely possible’. In fact, Aristotle gives a wide array of meanings to sumbebe¯kos: compare
this passage with Topics 103b14–19 and Met. 1025a31. On the reading given in both these
passages, the fact that the length of any side of a triangle is less than the sum of the other
sides counts as a sumbebe¯kos, but it is a necessary property.
14 ‘Metaphysical essence’ implies that the other notions are not metaphysical, and ‘alethic
essence’ implies that the other notions are not concerned with truth. I could have intro-
duced ‘cosmological essence’, with a nod to the worlds, but that seemed extravagant.
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ence (e.g., in the discussion of laws and causation), as well as inmetaphysics.
Since the other concepts of essence are (or at least can be) also modal, this
notion has been thought to be fundamental. ere are many examples of
properties that appear to be essential in all three senses. Triangles have three
sides: this property cannot be lost, it implies (given the background theory
of geometry) all the properties of a triangle, and it is necessary. So it may
be thought, or hoped, that the notions are at bottom the same, and with the
success modality has seen in the last few decades, this can be seen as the
modal notion.
I think this hope is misguided. But I likewise think the recent tendency
to downplay modality is also misguided. e problems that are addressed
by temporal and denitional essence are not always addressed by modal
essence, and there are problems addressed by modal essence that are un-
touched by other notions.e dierent notions of essence are conceptually
distinct, and rightly so.
2. Dierent Questions
I have dened three dierent notions of essence, and hinted at some prob-
lems each is supposed to answer. But the t of notions of essence to prob-
lems is a little more complex. ere is a cluster of issues that essence has
been directed toward, and writers on the topic have not always kept the var-
ious strands separate. Every question here has been taken by someone to be
answered by essence, but no since notion can answer them all.
1. e question of change: What is the dierence between simple al-
teration and destruction?e answer is supposed to be that essence
is preserved in every change short of destruction.
2. e explanation question: If something is so, what explains that it
is so? is question could be asked of individuals or kinds: what
explains why this individual dog has long ears, or what explains why
dogs in general are warm-blooded? e answer is supposed to be
that a thing’s being so is explained by its essence.
3. e categorization question: Does the world have a single correct
set of joints, and if so where does each entity t into the overall
structure? e answer is supposed to be that the essence of each
thing is the natural kind it belongs to.15
15 Aristotle oen takes the essence of a thing to be its genus and dierence, as in Posterior
Analytics 91a28. See also Locke III.iii.6. Some contemporary philosophers believe in some
kind of fundamental structure, but they do not believe this is essence (e.g., Fine 2012, Schaf-
fer 2009, Sider 2011, 267).
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4. e identication question: If a = b, in what does that identity con-
sist? For example, what is it that makes a thing at t1 the same thing
as something at t2, despite their many dierences? e answer is
supposed to be that a and b have the same essential properties, that
all the many dierences are only accidental.16
5. e discrimination question: If a ≠ b, in what does that dierence
consist? For example, what distinguishes the river from its water, or
what distinguishes two individuals of the same kind?e answer is
supposed to be that they dier in some essential property.17
6. e composition question: What makes something a unity, rather
than a heap? What is the dierence between Socrates, who is a unity,
and the mereological sum of the le half of Socrates and the right
half of Crito, which is just a heap?e answer is supposed to be that
Socrates has an essence, and the mereological sum does not. Again,
this question could be asked on individuals or kinds: what is it that
makes Socrates a unity, or what is it that makes gold a unity?18
7. e identity question: Given some entity, what is it that makes it
that entity?is is a deeper question than the identication and dis-
crimination questions, in that these can uniquely specify an entity
without giving any foundational account of what it is. e answer
is supposed to be that each entity has a unique essence that makes
it just that thing. (Once again, this question could be asked either
at the individual level or at the level of kinds.)19
8. e recognition question: When we are acquainted with a thing,
what are we acquainted with? It seems that acquaintance with
changing, or contingent, or inessential aspects of a thing cannot
count as knowledge of that thing. e answer is supposed to be
that knowledge is knowledge of the essence.20
16 Kripke argues in (1971) and (1980) that identity is essential, using ‘essential’ interchangeably
with ‘necessary’.
17 In footnote 56 of Naming and Necessity, Kripke relies on the principle that distinctness is
necessary/essential, which, as he points out, is not the same thing as proving that identity
is essential since it requires a stronger modal logic.
18 See AristotleMet. 1030b6–12, 1041b11–33, (Witt 1989).
19 Lowe (2012) argues that spacetime trajectory suces to distinguish physical objects, but
that this cannot be essential. Locke apparently meant by “real Essence” some identity con-
dition. It is also, arguably, what Aristotle had in mind.
20 Aristotle says inMet. 1028a36–40 that knowledge is knowledge of what something is; see
also the section above on essence as explanation. But see (Chisholm 1967) for some di-
culties with this view.
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Clearly not all of these questions can be answered by every concept of
essence. One simple reason for this is that dierent questions take dierent
entitities to be the bearers of essence. Some take essence to be primarily, or
exclusively, something that is had by kinds. e question of whether there
is a natural kind for biological species is the question of whether the kind
‘elephants’ has an essence independent of human interests. It is the elephant,
as a kind, that has (or would have) an essence, not any particular elephant.
us, essence is primarily an answer to the question of categorization. And
sometimes the essence of an individual is supposed to be a set of properties
that uniquely characterize that individual, including all itsmodal properties.
(In possible-worlds talk: a set of properties that uniquely characterize the
individual in all possible worlds.) us, essence is primarily an answer to
questions of identity.21
For Aristotle, the essence of an entity is given by a denition (Top.
101b38). Terms denoting kinds (e.g., ‘triangle’, ‘gold’) may be dened, and
these denitions give the essence of the thing. But Aristotle also uses indi-
viduals as examples of essences (e.g.,Met. 1029b14–15). Socrates is a human
being; essences of individuals like Socrates, according to the standard view,
are only classifying, and so, for example, Socrates andeatetus have the
same essence. On this view, Aristotle invokes essences to answer question
3, the categorization question. Combined with his epistemology, essence
also plays a role in answering questions 2 and 8. But, on this view, Aris-
totle’s essences play no individuating role, so questions 4–7 are out when
asked about individuals. (When asked about kinds, Aristotle might say that
horses and humans are dierent because they have dierent essences—one
is a four-footed animal and one is a two-footed animal.)22
Locke denes essence as “the Being of any thing, whereby it is what it
is. And thus the real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Con-
stitution of ings, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend, may be
called their Essence” (III.iii.15). Locke fully admits that individuals have
21 Certainly one may believe in both kind essences and individual essences. But it is also
consistent to believe in individual essences but not kind essences, and kind essences but
not individual essences. Aristotle is oen said to hold the latter view. For the former, one
may hold that kind is not an essential property of any individual. is individual is, in
fact, an elephant, but only accidentally. One may hold that individual essences are simple
properties, not classes or conjunctions of simple properties. (is is one view that goes
under the name haecceity. Each individual’s essence is its haecceity, but that essence does
not organize the world into kinds.)
22 But Aristotle also has some hints that essences are to play an individualizing role. As noted
above, Aristotle considers question 6 in Met. 1030b6–12, 1041b11–33. Witt (1989) argues
that the traditional account of Aristotle’s essence “is wrong in holding that the most im-
portant function of form or essence is to explain species membership,” and argues that,
instead of 7, 6 and 8 are the central questions Aristotle takes essence to answer.
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these essences—and hence that essence is supposed to answer the identity
question (7). And yet he insists that this is unknowable except in the case
of “simple Ideas and Modes” (e.g., ‘triangle’), and so cannot answer 2 and
8.us, all our categorizing and sorting and attempts at understanding are
relative to our own language or conceptual scheme. When Locke speaks of
a “nominal essence,” he acknowledges that the word ‘essence’ is taken to be
involved in the work of categorization and understanding, but he denies that
this “essence” is a mind-independent feature of reality.23
Fine (1994) is very Lockean. He is explicit about his interest in essence:
It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything
which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point,
rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to
the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in modal terms or
even to be regarded as extensionally equivalent to a modal notion.
Fine here declares that the notion of essence he will discuss is addressed
to the identity question (7). e modal notion is too weak to answer this
question, and some of these other questions, such as categorization and ex-
planation, are to be answered by ground, which for Fine is a dierent notion.
(And thus none of the three notions of essence listed above is Fine’s.)
What about the modalists? Which of these questions do they believe to
be answered by essence? Not all, of course, agree on every particular, and
some of these issues are controversial. But, since themodal notion is dened
in terms of necessity and identity, the questions of identity and distinctness
(4 and 5) are the primary concerns of a theory of essence. In Lecture III of
Naming and Necessity, Kripke argues that a particular human being neces-
sarily had her origin in a particular pair of gametes, and that a particular
table necessarily was formed from a particular chunk of matter. His argu-
ments for these views turn on intuitions that if the individual were dierent
in the relevant way, it would be a dierent individual. Kripke is not inter-
ested in giving a full list of essential properties, but a natural extension of
what he says here is that essence answers the categorization question (3):
if Elizabeth’s gametes are essential, so too is her species. But this is not a
forced move. One may agree with Kripke that origins are essential but dis-
agree that there are biological kinds. Because of vagueness issues and the
constant ux of species, species categorization is to some extent arbitrary,
even if individuals have their origins essentially.e composition question
(6) for natural kinds also seems a natural extension of the modal view, but
23 Locke’s Essay is long and repetitive, and there are passages that support a dierent reason
of essences than I have given. While I am no expert on Locke, I believe this reading is
justied by the text.
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the composition question for individuals seems largely unrelated. And in
sharply distinguishing the a priori from the necessary, Kripke clearly denies
that the recognition question (8) has anything to do with essence.
ere is some disagreement about whether themodal notion is intended
to address the explanation question (2). at is clearly the idea behind the
claims that, e.g., water is necessarily H2O: the necessary coincides with the
explanatorily basic. And yet many have seen this as a separate claim. Cowl-
ing (2013), for example, says “themodal view of essence does not hold. . . that
essential properties furnish use with answers to what-questions.” It is a sub-
stantial metaphysical claim that modality has anything to do with explana-
tion. Charles (2000) agrees, identifying three main theses in Kripke-style
“modern essentialism” about natural kinds:
1. Gold has a fundamental feature, of a type grasped by scientists, which
determines its other features.
2. Gold has one and the same feature in all possible worlds in which it
exists which xes the identity of the kind.
3. e fundamental feature in (1) is the identity-xing feature in (2).
e third thesis is the substantial claim that the modal notion is capable of
answering the explanation questions posed in the rst thesis. I agree with
Cowling and Charles: the modal notion of essence cannot answer the expla-
nation question; it is intended for dierent things.
3. Dierent Kinds of Essence
Dierent philosophers have taken essence to answer dierent questions.
How do we account for this dierence? One explanationmight be that there
is a single thing, essence, that each philosopher is trying to explain. Clearly
the mere fact that they dier on some details is not enough to say that they
are aer dierent things. Two philosophers may hold the modal notion of
essence, say, and disagree overwhether essence, thus understood, is explana-
tory. On such a question there may be a right answer. But this explanation
is insucient as an explanation of the disagreements among all the philoso-
phers. If one philosopher says that essence is whatever answers question
A, and another philosopher says that essence is whatever answers question
B, and nothing can answer both questions, then it is false to say they are
both trying to explain the same thing. I claim that none of the notions is
more basic (more natural, more “joint-carving”) than another. Of course, it
is open to someone to insist that one notion of essence—either one I have
listed above or a dierent one—ismore basic. But there is no obvious reason
to do so. None of the notions above implies the others, so none is logically
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prior. None is a restriction of any other. For the rst two notions, at least,
there is good reason to think that the “denitions” above are really char-
acterizations, that these notions of essence are explanatorily prior to their
denientia. Someone might insist that one of these notions is more funda-
mental, but there seems to be no compelling reason to do so.
My own view is that these are all real kinds of essence.ey are related
closely enough that none has a better claim to be the notion of essence, yet
they are distinct enough that there is no central kind. What needs to be
explained, then, is why they all deserve to be called the same thing. Why
not just say that there are three separate notions that, due to historical ac-
cident, have all come to be called ‘essence’, and the sooner we nd dierent
names for them the better? Cowling (2013), for example, takes the modal
notion of essence as basic, and since it cannot answer “what-questions,” the
answer to these questionsmust be something other than essence, something
he calls ‘nature’. Kung (1977), similarly, takes the Aristotelian view of essence
as basic, on which essence is explanatory, and dismisses anything that is in-
consistent with it. I nd such a procedure rash. It is not merely historical
accident that led all these to be called ‘essence’. ey each are attempts to
explain the “most important part” of a thing. Since importance is relative,
there are dierent notions of essence: one that picks out the fact that is most
important with respect to explanation, one that picks out the attribute that
is most important in terms of longevity, and so on. ‘Essence’ is not simply a
homonym like ‘bank’, with various unrelated concepts called the same thing
by happenstance. Essence is what gets at the kernel, the gist, the fundamen-
tal, the most important.24
We have many dierent conceptions of essence, and I would hate to be
forced to do without any of them. It is useful to have a notion that picks
out those properties that persist across the lifespan of a thing. It is useful
to have a notion that picks out an individual’s uniqueness and discriminates
it from every other individual. It is useful to have a notion that picks out a
thing’s place in the structure of the world. And it is useful to have a notion
that describes the nature of that structure itself. Useful notions all, and all
legitimate claimants to the the title of essence. But, unsurprisingly, there is
no single notion that can do all these jobs. So we have essence, essence, and
essence.
24is inchoate notion is not specic enough to make a generic sense of essence that is per-
fectly natural, from which the other notions can be dened by restriction.
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